This paper demonstrates that credit limit variability is a crucial aspect of the consumption, savings, and debt decisions of households in the United States. While typical models of intertemporal consumption fix the credit limit, variable credit limits create a reason for households to hold both high interest debts and low interest savings at the same time since the savings act as insurance. This approach can explain the credit card puzzle: why around a third of households in the U.S. hold both debt and liquid savings at the same time. Unlike other approaches it is consistent with observed changes over time. It also offers an important new channel for financial system uncertainty to affect household decisions. One of the largest "assets" in the portfolio of U.S. households is their ability to borrow. Increased uncertainty about credit limits reduces the value of this asset, and so has effects similar to a decline in wealth.
, found that out of 1069 respondents 17.5% had a credit limit cut at one time or another, and 10% had credit limits reduced in 2008 (Consumer Action, 2008) . While the survey is far from scientific, it does suggest that having ones credit limit cut is not uncommon. An earlier report in 2007 by the same group found that even during the boom years of consumer credit, three quarters of major banks had a policy of reducing credit limits for changes in credit scores or other reasons (Consumer Action, 2007) . Credit reports often contain errors (Hunt, 2002) which can result in unexpected reduced credit limits for some people even when credit is generally increasing. For example, the fourth of five tips for "Getting the most from your credit card" in the consumer information section of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors website suggests "If you can't pay your balance in full each month, try to pay as much of the total as you can. Over time, you'll pay less in interest charges-money that you will be able to spend on other things, and you'll pay off your balance sooner" (http://www.federalreserve.gov/ consumerinfo/fivetips_creditcard.htm, accessed 7 May 2010). If consumers keep liquid savings as a precautionary measure while borrowing to fund current consumption, then telling them to pay down expensive credit is bad advice, even if well intentioned. Interestingly, the financial gurus appear to understand risk. Dave Ramsey's seven steps to financial peace suggests building a $1000 emergency fund first, then paying off debt as step two (Ramsey, 2010) . That advice follows the clear hierarchy of payments shown in the model as wealth increases, see section 3.3. There have been a number of other proposed solutions to the credit card puzzle. Each of them 23 may be a motive for some households, but the evidence suggests that the explanation for most 24 5 The buffer-stock theory of inventory is closely related to the consumer's problem (Deaton, 1991; Deaton and Laroque, 1992) . Credit constraints can cause fluctuations in inventories (Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein, 1994). household lies somewhere else. The most obvious, although least interesting, is that the puzzle 1 is a mere accounting issue: wages or salary may be deposited directly in the bank before being 2 used to pay down debt. Then at its extreme, if wages are paid the day after the due date on a 3 credit card statement, there could be large balances for the entire month even though all available 4 cash is used to pay down the credit balance every month. Even allowing for a month of gross total 5 household income to be kept in liquid accounts, however, Gross and Souleles (2002) find that more 6 than one third of credit card borrowers keep more than this amount. Section 4.1 further explores 7 the effects of different assumptions about timing in the data, and shows that even allowing for large 8 accounting issues a substantial fraction of consumers must be borrowing and saving at the same 9 time. While it is possible that some households are simply making mistakes, the costs of doing so 10 are large enough to be noticeable: my estimates suggest that for those who are both borrowing and 11 saving the cost is around 0.6% of monthly household income; (Zinman, 2007b ) finds somewhat 12 smaller, but still non-trivial, costs.
13
The most compelling explanations are based on transaction uncertainty and so rely on similar 14 precautionary preferences to this paper. Telyukova and Wright (2008) suggest that the credit card 15 debt puzzle is just a new version of a much older question: why do people hold money, which 16 pays no interest and may have a negative return in the presence of inflation, when they could earn 17 a positive return in the bank? They propose a model in which some transactions cannot be paid 18 for with credit, since they take place anonymously and so must be settled on the spot. While There are several problems with explanation that relies on merchant acceptance to explain 25 why consumers might not pay off credit card balances with available cash. The first is that this 26 approach explains a different puzzle: why anyone caries cash in the form of Federal Reserve bank 27 notes. Cash pays no interest and is dominated as a payment mechanism by credit cards which 1 have limited liability if stolen, warranty protections, and often offer rewards of some sort. It makes 2 sense that consumers still carry cash in their pockets, along with credit cards, on the chance that 3 they will want to consume from a merchant who does not take a credit card.
4
Yet it seems that another explanation is needed to explain the portfolio decision of why such 5 a large fraction of households carry positive balances in savings accounts, while also keeping re-6 volving balances of credit. Table 1 shows how payment methods and the credit card puzzle have While it is more difficult to track cash transactions, the evidence suggests they have 13 been falling (Gerdes, 2008) . Moreover, the ability to get a cash advance on the credit card obvi-14 ates any need to keep money in an savings account to pay merchants who will not accept credit.
15
While cash advances are not often used compared to regular credit (they are more expensive, and 16 represent about 0.8 percent of credit card value), Gerdes (2008) points out that they are likely used 17 for emergencies since the average cash advance is much higher than the average ATM withdrawal.
18
The checks sent by credit card companies to use for cash advances even suggest their use for emer- suggests that another explanation is needed.
22
Trying to use the bankruptcy system, which protects some assets, may help explain the behavior 23 of some borrowers (Lehnert and Maki, 2002 ). Yet the fraction of households borrowing and saving Self-control issues are a different possible explanation. Hyperbolic discounting can explain a 1 separate puzzle: why credit card borrowers also hold illiquid assets as a self-control mechanism 2 (Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman, 2000) , but has difficulty explaining the short-term portfolio 3 decision of assets that are comparably liquid. Haliassos and Reiter (2007) and Bertaut, Haliassos, 4 and Reiter (2009) propose a model in which one portion of the household, the accountant, attempts 5 to control another part, the shopper, by limiting the credit line available. While such preferences 6 could coexist within one person, they are more likely in a household which has to make joint 7 decisions and so must reconcile potentially different preferences. While in the raw data discussed 8 in section section 4.1 married households are somewhat more likely to borrow and save at the 9 same time, a simple logit analysis shown in table 2 that controls for other possible demographic 10 differences such as age suggests that the likelihood of borrowing and saving at the same time is 11 only slightly higher and statistically insignificant for households in which a spouse or partner is 12 economically part of the household. Such self-control issues are unlikely to be a major explanation This section presents a basic model of intertemporal consumption and demonstrates that an opti-16 mizing household will never hold both debt and cash at the same time with a certain borrowing 17 limit, but may do so with a stochastic limit. For simplicity, it does not include several extensions 18 used in the simulations.
19
The model departs from the standard intertemporal consumption model in two ways: First, it 20 allows debt and cash consumption to be separate and decided separately. That means that there 21 are both two decisions variables and two states: debt and savings. In the standard model without a 22 stochastic debt limit, debt and cash wealth can be collapsed into a single state "assets" or "wealth"
23
and so do not have to be treated separately. Second, with a stochastic debt limit, it is possible 24 for a consumer to have debts greater than her debt limit, since she may have borrowed under a 25 previously higher limit. It is therefore necessary to specify what happens in this situation, which 26 never occurs in the standard model. For those above their debt limit, I assume that they must pay 1 at least the interest on the debt every period, and may pay more than that, but do not have to. So 2 debt, for those who are above their debt limit is non-increasing. A household dynasty or infinitely lived individual seeks to maximize:
where consumption in each time period is composed of two parts, consumption paid for with cash from the previous period both of which are immediately deposited. Cash wealth w t then evolves 10 according to:
where disposable income in period t + 1 is y t+1 with distribution G(·) whose support has a lower 12 bound y l > 0, and the safe rate of return on savings is r s > −1. The consumer can never spend 13 more cash than she has so that c w t ≤ w t , and so with w 0 ≥ y l given, w t ≥ y l for all t.
14 Cash balances are necessarily positive because the consumer gets some sort of consumable 15 resources each period, whether or not there is debt. This observation is the accounting explanation
16
for the credit card debt puzzle: we should expect to see positive cash balances unless the timing of 17 payments is such that wages can be paid directly into debt (if wages are garnished, for example).
18
The real puzzle then is not whether the individual has positive cash holdings during the period, but
19
whether she has cash savings from period to period that are positive w t − c w t > 0, while at the same 20 time carrying debts.
1
The evolution of debt is simpler, but the constraints on the choices are more complex. Debt b t 2 evolves according to
where r b > 0 is the borrowing interest rate. they represent debt and not a consolidated billing system.
13
I focus on the case where r b > r s so that borrowing is more costly than savings. Under these 14 circumstances the consumer might want to lend rather than borrow on the credit card. To keep this 15 from happening the lower bound on the debt consumption is that it can only pay off current debt:
17
The upper bound on debt consumption has two parts. Debt consumption can be up to the 18 available credit in the current period, as long as current debt is not above the debt limit. If current 19 debt is greater than the debt limit, then the consumer must pay at least the interest on the current 20 debt so the debt cannot grow. Then the full constraint on debt consumption is:
where the debt limit B t ≥ 0. the observation that for large numbers of consumers S t > 0 and D t > 0 in the same period.
7
Following the Lagrange approach (Chow, 1997) is more straightforward for stating the consumer's problem since the constraints are crucial. Given w 0 > 0, B t ≥ 0, and b 0 ≥ 0 the consumer's problem is:
where the λ's have an attached complementary slackness constraint and are the multipliers from the associated Lagrange equation:
Fixed debt limit

8
This section shows the well known result that no optimizing consumer who can borrow this period 9 (b t < B) has both S t > 0 and D t > 0 at the same time if the debt limit is not stochastic so
10
B t = B > 0. The reason to show this result is that setting up the first order conditions makes it 11 obvious how the problem change when B t is stochastic in the next section, and so it makes clear 12 why credit limit variability is so important. 
which include the inequality constraints, non-negativity constraints for the λ's and complementary t = 0, and so using the FOC's for D t and S t gives:
and substituting from the conditions for w t+1 and b t+1 :
Since marginal utility is positive, λ may bind, and so the decisions today affect the costs of the constraint binding in the next period.
The FOC for b t+1 now reads: 
and it is possible for D * t and S * t to both be positive at the same time without violating optimal 2 behavior.
3
Equation 6 also gives some insight into the behavior that leads to D * t and S * t both being positive.
Rearranging equates the marginal costs to the marginal benefits of increasing both D t and S t and so entering the next period with (in expectation) both more debt and more savings:
The price of higher debt and higher savings is the difference interest rates (r b − r s ) which means 4 there will be lower cash next period with an expected marginal utility cost in the next period
Since holding less cash and more debt 6 decreases cash wealth next period, marginal utility increases. Increasing both cash and debt leaves 7 consumption unchanged, and so has no cost this period (as long as the debt constraint λ D t is not
The assumption that B t ∈ {0, B} means that the decision about D t and so b t+1 does not affect the distribution of 1(b * t+1 > B t+1 ) since the restrictions on D t mean that b t+1 ≤ B for all t. So the simplification allows me to ignore that having more debt might make it more likely that the debt limit will bind by increasing the probability that b * t+1 > B t+1 . binding).
1
The right hand side gives the expected benefit in the next period increasing both cash and debt 2 left to next period. It is the expected cost of the debt limit binding next period. When the debt 3 limit binds, the household wants to consume more through debt, so the costs of the debt limit bind-4 ing are high when marginal utility is high. If the period utility function displays a precautionary 5 motive, u (·) < 0, then marginal utility is decreasing, although a borrowing constraint imposes 6 a precautionary motive all by itself (Carroll and Kimball, 2001) . When the debt limit binds, then 7 consumption is determined by the amount of cash savings, so increasing both savings and debt 8 reduces the cost of the debt limit binding since marginal utility is decreasing. So the cost of the 9 debt limit binding tend to be high when marginal utility is high: with a bad shock (low y t+ 1 ) and 10 low cash wealth. In this case the costs of extra debt are small, while the benefits of increased 11 cash-at-hand are large, and it is worth paying the carrying cost of a little extra debt to keep some 12 cash as insurance.
13
The savings and debt decisions D t and S t for someone facing an uncertain debt limit next necessarily zero, and S t is zero until there is enough cash wealth that the consumer wants to save 23 for next period as in the standard consumption policy with liquidity constraints (Deaton, 1991).
24
When borrowing is possible in the upper left plot, however, those with low cash this period choose 25 to finance their consumption from borrowing, while keeping some cash in case they lose access to 26 borrowing next period. Eventually they have enough cash to pay back the debt, so D t goes to zero, and all additional transfers to the next period come from higher S t . With higher debt in the lower 1 left plot, the transition from paying off debt to active saving occurs at a higher wealth point.
2
With a variable debt limit, it is possible to have positive debt, but not to be able to borrow 3 more, a situation illustrated by the bottom right plot. With a fixed debt limit, no feasible path 4 which starts within the debt limit ever reaches such a situation, and so it can be safely ignored.
5
With a variable debt limit, it is possible to have positive debt from the period before, and to have 6 the borrowing limit decline so that adding to that debt is no longer possible. It is not optimal to 7 use all available cash to pay back the debt, however, since then one might enter the next period 8 still unable to borrow and with no cash. Instead, consumers choose to save and only start paying 9 down debt once they reach a certain level of wealth. After the consumer reaches a certain level of 10 insurance from saving cash for the next period, the consumer devotes all additional cash wealth to 11 paying down the debt from the previous period. Once all of the debt is paid, the consumer adds to Some additional assumptions are needed to assure that infinite accumulation is not in the optimal 22 path (Clarida, 1987; Rabault, 2002; Schechtman and Escudero, 1977) , but all of the simulations 23 here meet those conditions.
24
While incomes and debt limits occasionally go down, consumer credit and incomes have gen-25 erally been increasing. The analysis goes through, however, with underlying growth that increases 26 incomes and debt limits at the same rate, together with the restriction of the period utility to show 27 constant relative risk aversion . Then the analysis proceeds in ratios (Carroll, 2004; Deaton, 1991 ): 1 a low debt limit to income ratio next period means that it may be worth having both cash to income 2 and debt to income positive this period. With growth the consumer keeps cash as a precaution 3 against the debt to income ratio being low. Since growth tends to make consumers more impatient, 4 it will tend to make borrowing more attractive, and so increase the proportion of the population 5 which both borrows and saves at the same time. Ludvigson (1999) examines such a situation with 6 stochastic debt limits, although explicitly limits the analysis to exclude borrowing and saving at 7 the same time.
8
While rising incomes may not be especially important for monthly consumption and debt de-9 cisions, the same approach of examining ratios is useful for comparing a population with very 10 different incomes. Under the same conditions, those with different permanent incomes will make 11 the same choices in ratios: a person who has a high wealth to permanent income ratio will choose 12 to consume the same fraction of income whether her permanent income is large or small. This In the SCF, 97% of households with a revolving credit card balance also held liquid assets.
5
Yet the near universal holding of liquid assets is most likely an accounting artifact. The questions 6 from the survey ask for the credit card balance after the household made the last payment; and for 7 the household's holdings of liquid assets as of the time of the survey-which may be frequently 8 interpreted as of the last statement. To deal with this timing issue, I examine savings accounts and checking accounts separately.
23
Both are very liquid in the sense that for most savings accounts the balance can be shifted to a 24 checking account easily, or sometimes payments can come directly from the savings account. The exact extent of the credit card puzzle is thus somewhat uncertain. I therefore put less 25 emphasis on the parameters which give the best fit to the SCF, since these depend heavily on the 1 data assumptions, and much more emphasis on whether the model can explain a wide range. The dimension of the problem is compounded by a problem of scaling: in the short term the 10 decision of how much to consume in total is much more important for utility that the portfolio 11 decision of how that consumption should be financed. The problem is similar to trying to find 12 the highest point on a knifed edged ridge which falls off steeply on either side and slopes only for a given set of preferences, debt limit, and income processes.
24
With the consumption functions for a given set of parameters, it is possible to find how a 25 community of people with those preferences facing those income and debt shocks would behave.
26
As long as preferences are such that no one wants to save indefinitely, the community will have an 1 ergodic distribution of wealth, debt and consumption. I approximate that distribution by taking a 2 large population of individuals, and endowing them with an initial state of wealth and debt. With shows that it is easy to a large fraction of the population to save and borrow at the same time for 12 empirically reasonable parameters. I show many variations both to understand how different pref-13 erences and risks affect the decisions, and also to demonstrate that the model's ability to generate 14 savings and debt decisions similar to the data is not sensitive to small changes in parameters
15
Consumers are faced with unexpected disposable income shocks: every so often they face some 16 unexpected emergency which absorbs some fraction of income, but does not add to utility. For process: with probability π low the disposable income is y low , and is one otherwise. Similarly the 24 debt limit varies between two states: with probability π B the consumer is unable to borrow, other-25 wise B t = B. I assume preferences display constant relative risk aversion, with the coefficient of 26 relative risk aversion γ.
1 While I will allow preference parameters and difficult to observe parameters to vary, many of 2 the prices and limits are observable. I set the interest rate earned on savings r s = 0.4%, and the 3 interest paid on debt r b = 14.22%.
10 I set the maximum debt limit B = 2, implying that the 4 maximum that any consumer can borrow is 2 times monthly income. The median debt limit as a 5 proportion of monthly income in the 2007 SCF is 2.12. There are some very large credit limits 6 which push up the mean, but for the 94% of households with credit limits below 12 times monthly 7 income the mean is 2.74. the fraction of the simulated population that holds both debt and savings at the same time, the 10 fraction that holds only debt (and so has no savings), mean log savings and debt. Figure 5 shows 11 different preferences towards risk, while 6 show different discount rates. The axis of each graph 12 varies the disposable income left in the bad state, and so varies the costs of not being able to 13 borrow. I fix the probability of a bad state π low at 1/12, so that the bad event happens on average 14 once a year. 12 Allowing the probability of the bad state to vary has a similar effect to varying the 15 income in the bad state and so I do not show it separately. I set the probability of losing access to 16 borrowing in a given month at 1%. The probability of losing access to borrowing acts mostly to 17 shift the curves right or left, and so is similar to changes in risk aversion. I show what happens 18 10 The average interest paid on a no-frills Wells Fargo savings account was 0.15% in 2006 (the year the SCF was in the field), while it was 0.615% for a Bank of America account with a minimum deposit of $20,0000. The average interest earned is somewhere between. The the average credit card interest rate reported in the SCF is 14.22% while it was 14.73% based on Federal Reserve series G19, Commercial Bank Interest Rate on Credit Card Plans NSA. The CPI was 2.5% in 2006 according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. I do not adjust the interest rates for inflation.
11 These calculations do not take into account survey weighting. The mean with survey weighting of those under 12 is 3.3. Dividing by income creates a problem when income is measured with error or is not a good approximation of permanent income. The outliers for credit limits appear to come from very low reported incomes.
12 Is a 1 in 12 probability of a bad event that costs a substantial portion of monthly disposable income reasonable? According to the National Highway Safety Administration there were just over 6 million car accidents in 2007 (National Highway Trafic Safety Administration, 2009), while there were 112 million households in 2007 (Kreider and Elliott, 2009), implying that there was on average slightly more than one car accident for every 20 households in 2007. There were 2.4 million deaths from all causes, which suggests that on the order of 2% of households had to pay for a funeral (see Center for Disease Control http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/deaths.htm, accessed 2 May 2010). In addition, there are many large consumption events which allow for some planning beforehand, but are unexpected sufficiently long in advance. For example, one may learn about weddings, births, and moving from one residence to another many months before hand, but until the information is revealed they are probabilistic events which add to the uncertainty of disposable income in the future. following a change in the probability of losing access in section 5.
1
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate that it does not require unreasonable beliefs about the risk of losing 2 access to credit to generate a population that is willing to hold debt and save at the same time in 3 fractions similar to the SCF. The fraction of those who hold both debt and savings at the same time 4 jumps from close to zero to between 0.25 and 0.5 rapidly as the income in the bad state declines.
5
For many parameter values, over a wide range of preferences, a small risk of losing access to credit 6 results in a substantial fraction of the population holding both liquid savings and debt at the same 7 time.
8
While it is not hard to match the fraction in the SCF who hold both savings and debt, households 
Preference heterogeneity
15
In figures 5 and 6, the rapid change from almost nobody holding debt and savings at the same 16 time to a substantial fraction is mirrored by a similar rapid change as the fraction willing to hold 17 debt and no savings drops to zero. The reason both of these change rapidly at the same level The simulated distribution also matches some of the comparative features of the data well. In while still having savings left over-they do not need to use debt to maintain savings as insurance.
25
So using both savings and debt occurs among the less wealthy, although not the poorest who from 26 preferences or necessity do not maintain any liquid wealth. This feature of the data is matched 27 by the simulations. Such a distribution cannot be explained by an alternative explanations based 1 on inattention or mistakes in which some people just make a mistake and do not pay of a credit 2 card bill used mainly for transactions, or do not consider the costs of not paying it off. Mistakes 3 or inattention are more costly for poorer people, since marginal utility is higher, and so one would 4 expect to see those with lower savings making mistakes less often. The shocks to disposable income in the previous sections are independent and identically dis-7 tributed. It makes more sense to allow for some serial correlation so that bad shocks are more 8 likely after bad shocks. Losing a job is generally a low probability event, but conditional on being 9 unemployed one month, the probability of being unemployed the next month is much higher. To Increases in the probability of losing access to credit causes an immediate decline in consump- however, which tends to cause debt to decrease. Unless there is a large increase in the probability 17 of losing access to credit which pushes even those who are not risk averse into borrowing and 18 saving at the same time, the fraction borrowing and saving at the same time changes only slightly.
19
The changes are thus almost entirely on the intensive rather than extensive margin, and so helps 20 explain the remarkable stability of credit card puzzle over time in figure 1. The averages hide substantial and important heterogeneity which is only evident when using the 7 panel. While 42% of households had credit limits that were lower by $1,000 or more in 2009 than 8 in 2007, 40% reported credit limits that were higher by more than $1000. Yet responses of these 9 two groups is startlingly different when their credit limits change. Table 3 and similar amounts of savings. Those who lost credit were slightly older. For those who lost 13 credit the decrease was from an average credit limit of $43,000 credit to less than $20,000, while 14 those who gained went from $22,000 to $41,000. These differences are not caused by changes in 15 incomes: incomes barely changed, and the credit card limit to income ratio shows nearly the same 16 story. Indeed it looks much like the two groups have switched places in terms of savings, debt and 17 credit limit ratios.
18
Losing or gaining credit is closely related to increases and decreases in credit card debt. Those long-term drop in credit limits for some of the population than a widespread increase in the proba-6 bility of a reduction in the credit limit. The group that lost credit was not poorer on average as table   7 3 shows, but they had large declines in credit limits while others had substantial gains. Moreover, 8 a substantial portion of the population was cut off entirely, and so benefited directly from having 9 liquid savings. That suggests that just as cyclical drops in income are not distributed evenly across 10 the population with large welfare consequences, decreases in credit limits are concentrated as well. Yet there is far more work to be done. While credit limits do vary, it is difficult to determine 4 how frequently, by how much, and why. If credit is cut because income is cut, then the house-5 hold loses credit exactly when it wants it most, which makes liquid savings especially valuable.
6
Poor households may be particularly vulnerable to such cuts exactly because they have few other 7 resources. With the ability to borrow so important in the constraints faced by households, we still 8 know very little about how credit limits change and their effects on households.
9
A Simulations
1
The two continuous decision variable, two continuous state, multiple discrete state infinite horizon 2 stochastic problem described has a number of complexities that make it difficult to simulate. The 3 first is that the "curse of dimensionality" means that a discrete approximation of the continuous 4 state variables that is fine enough to capture the changes in, for example, figure 4, quickly grows in 5 the memory required.
14 I use cubic spines to approximate the value function, reducing the number 6 of states necessary to achieve a good approximation.
7
A second difficulty is that the natural monthly frequency makes the discount factor close to one 8 for reasonable annual discount factors (the conversion is β monthly = (1 + β annual ) −1/12 ). Function 9 iteration techniques therefore tend to converge slowly, since initial conditions matter for many 10 iterations.
11
The form of the problem creates its own difficulties. The function iteration step which takes a function V t+1 to a function V t :
where X = (c about debt versus cash consumption, but cares a great deal about their sum, total consumption.
13
The maximization problem in the function iteration step for a given set of state variables tends to 14 look like a ridge rather than a mountain: along a locus that keeps total consumption constant the 15 function increases slowly to an optimum allocation of consumption to debt and cash.
Stepping 16 off from that ridge-increasing or decreasing total consumption-makes a big difference in utility,
17
while moving along it the change in utility is relatively small. This scaling problem leads to a 18 tendency to overshoot in one direction or another, and makes single derivative "method of steepest methods (Judd, 1998; Miranda and Fackler, 2002) , and is important in this problem because of the 30 tendency to oscillate. Along regime changes for V t+1 , where the decision variables go from being 31 constrained to unconstrained, the first derivative tends exhibit a kink, and so the second derivative 32 becomes discontinuous. Close to the states (w t , b t ) for which (w t+1 , b t+1 ) is at a regime change, the 33 second derivative is very irregular since the smooth approximation of V t+1 cannot approximate dis-34 continuities well. Increasing the number of nodal points for the splines does not solve the problem,
35
14 When I attempted a discretized version of the problem, it exceeded the addressable memory of a 32-bit system (approximately 4GB are possible, although Windows and some Unix systems throttle that to 2GB, see http:// www.mathworks.com/support/tech-notes/1100/1106.html) well before the approximations of the continuous choices were anywhere close to smooth. but only more precisely finds the states (w t , b t ) with the problem. The ridge nature of the prob-1 lem makes method of steepest ascent (Judd, 1998, p. 111) frequently not converge, and so after up of some fraction λ with preference parameter γ 1 and (1 − λ) with parameter γ 2 , it is necessary 15 to combine two difference vectors
The MSM then seeks to minimize 17 H(θ, γ 1 , γ 2 , λ).
18
The problem can be rewritten to reduce the optimization problem since λ depends only on the 19 best mix of moments, it can be solved for any given γ 1 , γ 2 and their corresponding preferences.
20
Since the simulations are computationally intensive, this approach uses the structure of the problem 21 to find λ without any additional simulation. Define H 1 = g 1 W g 1 , H 2 = g 1 W g 1 and the cross 22 moment H 12 = g 1 W g 2 . Then some matrix algebra can show that the optimal λ = H 2 −H 12 H 1 −2H 12 +H 2 23 since W is symmetric H 12 = H 21 . The denominator can be written (g 1 − g 2 ) W (g 1 − g 2 ), which is 24 positive as long as (g 1 − g 2 ) since it is a quadratic form with W positive definite. The denominator 25 may be positive or negative, and the entire expression need not necessarily be less than one, in 26 which case the data is suggesting that it would like to have even less than none of one the two 27 populations. So λ is 0 if the expression is negative, and one if greater than or equal to one. Notes: In both panels (a) is the amount left over after the credit card bill has been paid (possibly not completely leaving debt for the next period) but before income or any consumption. The model timing has income coming at the beginning of the period, then consumption and the savings/debt decision at the end. In reality, income may come at any time in during the month, and consumption need not take place at the same time that the credit card bill is paid. We may observe (b) or (c) instead, of (a). Cash wealth this period
Cash Savings Debt
Notes: The left column shows the debt and cash consumption policies c w (w t , b t ) and c b (w t , b t ) over a range of cash wealth w t and for debt this period b t equal to 0 in the first row and 0.5 in the second row. The right column shows the corresponding debt and savings held to the next period:
Consumers may borrow up to B t = 1 in every period; there is no borrowing uncertainty. See appendix for approximation algorithms. The parameters used are: subutility is CRRA with γ = 2; annual rates r b = 0.12, r s = 0.02, β = 1/(1−0.10) are all converted into monthly by (1+r)
(1/12) −1; y t+1 is a three point Gaussian quadrature approximation of a lognormal with mean of 1 and variance parameter 0.1 combined with an iid 10% chance of unemployment in which the earnings are 0.3. 
Cash wealth this period
Notes: Each subplot shows the debt and savings held to the next period: S t = w t −c w (w t , b t ) and D t = b t +c b (w t , b t ) over a range of cash wealth w t and for debt this period b t equal to 0 in the first row and 0.5 in the second row. The left column shows the debt and savings decisions when borrowing is possible this period and B t = 1. The right column shows the debt and savings decisions when borrowing is not possible this period B t = 0. B t+1 is an i.i.d. random variable which is 0 with probability 0.1 and 1 otherwise so consumers face a 10% chance of not being able to borrow in the next period. See appendix for approximation algorithms. The parameters used are: subutility is CRRA with γ = 2; annual rates r b = 0.12, r s = 0.02, β = 1/(1 − 0.10) are all converted into monthly by (1 + r)
(1/12) − 1; y t+1 is a three point Gaussian quadrature approximation of a lognormal with mean of 1 and variance parameter 0.1 combined with an iid 10% chance of unemployment in which the earnings are 0.3. Probability lose access to borrowing increase to 2% Probability increase to 3%
Credit limit reduced by 25%, prob. increase to 2% β = 0.9 γ 1 =1.25 γ 2 =2.5 λ=0.24 π low =1/12
Notes: Shows the evolution of debt, savings, and consumption following a change in the probability of losing access to credit in month 12. Preferences and risks are those that best fit the 2007 SCF distribution with preference heterogeneity. Notes: The table shows the marginal effects from a multinomial (non-ordered) logit regression of those with credit cards using the 2007 SCF. The reported coefficients are calculated at the mean and show the marginal effect of moving into having both savings and debt simultaneously using savings defined as Savings + (Checking -Income). The four categories are (1) positive debt, positive savings, (2) positive debt, no savings, (3) positive savings, no debt, (4) no savings, no debt. The regression uses only a single imputation since the sample and categories vary over imputations. Not accounting for imputation variability leaves the coefficients unbiased, but understates the standard errors. 
